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3P R E FAC E
As part of its Observatory Program, Istanbul Policy 
Center (IPC), in cooperation with the Transatlantic 
Academy, organized a third conference on the theme 
of the future of the liberal order.1 This one-day round-
table, “The Sliding West,” took place on May 28, 2015 at 
the Washington, DC headquarters of German Marshall 
Fund of the United States. The purpose of this round-
table, like that of the preceding ones, was to develop 
new ideas and gain fresh insights from a small group of 
international participants with a view to contributing 
to the ongoing debates on the shaping of the post-
Western world.
This series of conferences has drawn upon the work 
done by the Transatlantic Academy over the past three 
years but is not confined solely to the issues taken 
up by the Transatlantic Academy fellows. The first 
conference held in Istanbul on May 22-23, 2013, took 
as its point of departure the Transatlantic Academy’s 
2013 report Transatlantic Disconnect: Citizenship and 
Accountability in the Transatlantic Community.2 The 
questions that arose in that meeting have been incorpo-
rated in the conference report Considering the Future 
of the Liberal Order: Hope, Despair and Anticipation.3 
The second meeting took as its point of departure the 
Transatlantic Academy’s 2014 report Liberal Order 
in a Post-Western World. That report acknowledged 
at the outset that the West’s “material and ideo-
logical hegemony” was coming to an end.4 However, 
it concluded that the Western world would be able to 
play a significant role in promoting liberal values and 
practices and contribute to the shaping of a rules-
based world in future, provided that it has the ability 
to recover “its political and economic strength.”5 These 
ideas were condensed into the conference report The 
Liberal Order in Peril: The Future of the World Order 
with the West against the Rising Rest.6 
1 See Appendix.
2 Transatlantic Academy, Transatlantic Disconnect: Citizenship and Ac-
countability in the Transatlantic Community (Washington, DC: Transatlan-
tic Academy, 2013). 
3 Ahmet O. Evin, Onur Sazak, and Lisa J. Repell, Considering the Future of 
the Liberal Order: Hope, Despair and Anticipation (Istanbul: Istanbul Poli-
cy Center, 2013). 
4 Transatlantic Academy, Liberal Order in a Post-Western World (Washing-
ton, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2014), 13. 
5 Ibid., 166. 
6 Ahmet Evin and Megan Gisclon, The Liberal Order in Peril: The Future of 
the World Order with the West against the Rising Rest (Istanbul: Istanbul 
Policy Center, 2015). 
The third conference, detailed in this report, took as its 
point of departure the Transatlantic Academy’s 2015 
report, Faith, Freedom, and Foreign Policy: Challenges 
for the Transatlantic Community.7 That report empha-
sized the need for the West to adhere to its liberal 
values in order to reinforce its stand to prevent global 
divergence away from the liberal order. The West as a 
whole, especially the United States, needed to stand 
up for its values in a more prominent way than it has in 
recent years.
The Observatory’s Chatham House roundtable 
format lent itself to the tentative nature of intellectual 
considerations in respect to the perceived changes in 
the global order. One can anticipate a future world on 
the basis of the clues gleaned from current trends; but, 
how the future world might differ from ours remains a 
matter of intellectual speculation.
7 Transatlantic Academy, Faith, Freedom, and Foreign Policy: Challenges for 
the Transatlantic Community (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 
2015). 
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First on the agenda of the “The Sliding West” was 
Russia vis-à-vis the United States and the European 
Union (EU). In the opening statement it was claimed 
that there was a striking difference between the latter 
two. The United States and the EU were like “Mars and 
Mercury” when it came to dealing with Russia: While 
the United States focused on military confrontation 
with Russia, the EU emphasized commercial relations. 
For years, the Russian economy had been crippled by 
U.S.-led sanctions, whereas the EU had been more 
open regarding its trade with Russia, largely because 
of its heavy reliance on Russian oil and natural gas. In 
response to recent displays of Russian military aggres-
sion, it was the United States that had been consistently 
critical; it has taken the lead in deploying U.S. troops 
to Russian border countries such as the Baltic States, 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary in Operation 
Atlantic Resolve to train and arm local armies with a 
view to preparing them to stand up to future cases of 
Russian aggression. Further and more importantly, 
disagreement regarding the Syrian conflict had reig-
nited the longtime rivalry between the U.S. and Russian 
hegemony in the Middle East, especially since Russia 
had shown that it had no qualms about attacking U.S.-
trained anti-Assad forces. 
There was a clear civilizational gap between Russia 
and the West as reflected in the discrepancy between 
the idea and rhetoric emanating from the two sides. 
Although the West, specifically the United States, 
had tried to reach out to Russia, the Russian agenda 
both before and after the Cold War had proven to be 
a formidable impediment to the implementation and 
success of Western liberalism. Over forty years ago, the 
Soviet Union had signed the Helsinki Accords, marking 
what most people had thought was the beginning of a 
new era of common understanding between Europe 
and Russia. The two blocs agreed on a joint acceptance 
of “Western” principles, i.e. the post-modern, demo-
cratic status quo after World War II, which would, it 
was thought, ease tensions between the two powers. 
However, those who appeared optimistic about the 
accords had since lost hope. Russia had openly and 
plainly violated the entire document of the Helsinki 
Final Act, and there appeared no end in sight to its 
continuing defiance of its basic principles. 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had 
been actively engaging with Moscow with a view to 
bringing Russia into partnership with the West. The 
United States had been doing so because it realized 
Russia’s importance and the potentially positive role it 
could play in global affairs. Russia’s resistance to adopt 
the liberal order had been disappointing for the United 
States and its Western allies. But many continued to 
hope that as a result of intensive dialogue along with 
increased pressure from sanctions Russia would even-
tually adopt the Western liberal order. But, a quarter 
century after the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
bipolar world order, the question needed to be asked: 
Will Russia ever get the Western perspective? 
Although the West believed it had been largely concil-
iatory toward Russia since the Cold War (a claim with 
which not only Putin but other leaders in Moscow 
would hardly agree), Russia was perceived to be 
deliberately unreceptive to the West’s advances. It had 
retained the deep mistrust of the West inculcated in the 
Bolshevik era and had seen a link between the West’s 
longtime imperial aims and its own economic demise 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Western 
scholars and policymakers had underestimated the 
psychological effects of the Soviet Union’s demise on 
the Russian people. The end of the Cold War appeared 
to hold the promise of a better, economically more 
prosperous, and liberal Western lifestyle for Russians. 
However, the reality was another decade of economic 
hardship, instability, and political uncertainty in a 
difficult transition from the strong-arm of Soviet lead-
ership to what was hoped to be a more inclusive demo-
cratic system. Instead, chaos prevailed. The economic 
consequences of the Soviet collapse, coupled with the 
disengagement of its former satellite states, strained 
the newly born Russian Federation. Moreover, Russia’s 
fall from being an imperial power and landing in a new, 
unipolar world led by the United States and its allies 
struck a tremendous blow to Russia’s national pride. 
Although towards the end of the Soviet era Russia had 
only a fraction of its former power left, it nevertheless 
had wielded influence over its satellite states. The real 
blow came with its loss of influence over many of its 
dependents; the Russian pride sustained the shock of 
seeing Warsaw Pact countries applying for member-
ship of the EU and the Newly Independent States of 
Central Asia welcoming U.S. assistance to open them 
up directly to global markets bypassing Russian trans-
port connections. It has been clear since the beginning 
of its recovery from the Soviet era that Russia was still 
seeking to rewrite history by its own right, longing for a 
return to the nineteenth-century imperial state it once 
was. It was hard to fall to the bottom after being on top.
5Only by the end of the 1990s, after Vladimir Putin’s 
1999 appointment as prime minister and his subse-
quent election in 2000 as president that Russia’s tran-
sition problems appeared to be somewhat alleviated. 
Putin had been pursuing two aims: to regain stability 
and reclaim influence in the world. In 2015, he could 
be judged as successful in both. With Russia’s GDP 
quintupling from 2000-2008, seeing only a slight drop 
from 2008-2012, and then recovering and rising after 
2012, Putin had certainly managed to regain overall 
stability for Moscow. 
How long could this positive economic performance 
last? Until recently prospects for an economic down-
turn did not cause much anxiety. Putin put resources 
into a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Although not one of the 
largest among funds its kind, it could nevertheless be 
mobilized to tide over Russia’s finances in the case of a 
downturn. The overall optimistic outlook for Russian 
finances, however, had been the result of rising oil 
(and therefore natural gas) prices rather than Putin’s 
management of the economy.
As a result of the unexpected drop in oil prices to 
surprisingly low levels, Russia’s finances had been 
seriously squeezed. Although hydrocarbon prices 
were expected to recover, when and to which level 
they would recover could not be predicted. Two new 
questions had arisen under the current circumstances: 
(i) Would Russia be forced to reduce its international 
engagements, particularly military and naval deploy-
ments abroad? (ii) Was Putin facing the dangers of 
losing some of his charisma as a result of the looming 
economic problems? 
In his quest to reclaim influence, Putin had been 
successful in presenting a strong and unified picture of 
Russia, pitting his state against the West and its powers. 
There was a widely accepted view in Russia of a West 
that is paranoid and delusional: a West that actively 
undermined Russia and Russian interests in order 
to keep Russia unstable. This perception implicated 
both NATO and the EU and led to the belief that the 
West presented a serious military threat to Russia. 
As a consequence, Russia believed it had the duty to 
protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers outside 
of Russia, the Russkiy Mir in its neighborhood. In 
Russia’s view such a conspiracy theory had lent legiti-
macy to its actions. In fact, as Russia understood it, it 
was Russia’s legitimate right to project its influence 
(read power) across the globe to balance the West’s 
ambitions and threat. However, in reality Russia was 
still a nineteenth-century power that believed in the 
naked use of force. It believed in the benefits of rela-
tive power, and that, in order to have relative power, it 
also had to have unstable neighbors dependent on it for 
protection and influence. The rising narrative enforced 
by Putin’s government and reinforced by the Russian 
Orthodox Church had built a culture of paranoia and 
defense, catapulting Russia away from the West rather 
than moving towards it.
Further, after the May 2015 Riga Summit, Russia had 
indicated that the Eastern Partnership—a joint initia-
tive involving the EU to increase multilateral relations 
between the EU, its member states, and their Eastern 
European partners, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine—had 
been intended to pull Eastern European countries 
away from Russia, thus justifying its recent history of 
reckless military actions. On the one hand, the Eastern 
Partnership’s continued commitment to the EU in 
Riga had increased the West’s sphere of influence in 
Eastern European countries, further isolating Russia. 
On the other, Russia’s failure to fulfill its international 
commitments continued to deepen Western mistrust 
and distance diplomacy. As a result, Russia, it may be 
argued, felt encircled and responded once more with 
a show of force and reckless military action. It was 
not surprising that Russia had chosen Ukraine as its 
“whipping boy” in the region. To Russia, Ukraine had 
appeared divided and weak in the wake of the demon-
strations leading to the Maidan Revolution of February 
2014, culminating in the Ukrainian President Yanu-
kovych’s flight to Moscow. At issue had been Yanuko-
vych’s sudden refusal to sign an association agreement 
with the EU, despite his earlier announcement to the 
contrary, instead signing an agreement with Russia. 
The Yanukovych regime’s disproportionate use of 
force against demonstrators leading to casualties 
had provoked a revolutionary regime change, which 
Moscow had claimed to be illegitimate. Moscow then 
had taken advantage of Ukraine’s weak moment and 
sent troops to Ukraine and Crimea to annex the latter 
and instigate a secessionist revolt in the former. This, it 
appeared, had provided Putin with a means to reverse 
his declining popularity, and it had worked.
Putin’s belief in himself and in the “New Russia” 
had certainly posed a threat to the neighborhood 
and regional stability. There was much international 
concern over the annexations of South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, and Crimea, as well as Russian troops located 
in Transnistra. Increased Russian pressure on Georgia, 
as well as other neighbors, was directed not only at 
governments but also at civil society and the cultural 
arena. Economic pressure was also used for imposing 
Russia’s will on those countries and forcing them to 
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join the Eurasian Union instead of moving towards the 
West. Minority rights, particularly in Chechnya, were 
ignored under Russia’s influence; domestic as well as 
foreign NGOs had come under Russian attack as part of 
Moscow’s plan to undermine democracy in the region.
Putin appeared to have a tacit contract in mind: he 
seemed to be saying that in return for the stability and 
prosperity he had given to the Russian people, he would 
expect the Russian people to give him unchecked 
power. As Russia juxtaposed itself belligerently against 
the liberal order, it also forestalled international coop-
eration. For example, cooperation in the Arctic and 
Africa had come to an end.
Given that Russia chose to threaten its neighbors and 
thus regional security, the question of what could be 
done about Putin’s “New Russia” came up—a question 
that is as real as it is rhetorical. Ought the West simply 
take Russia for what it was? Or give Russia a chance to 
reset its policies? The West needed to be prepared, as 
some arguments ran, to support those neighborhood 
countries threatened by Russia— be even prepared to 
play the NATO card to signal its serious commitment 
to defend those countries against Russian aggression. 
The West, however, also needed to adopt an appro-
priate and effective strategy, an essential prerequisite 
of which was to learn how to counter Russia’s hybrid 
warfare. An opposing viewpoint offered was to assess 
the regional reaction from Russia’s optic: the West 
needed to recognize, the argument went, that Russia 
had an interest in Eastern Europe, perhaps even more 
than the United States or EU did. If the West was not 
ready to take that viewpoint into account, what other 
policies could it pursue? 
The alternative policies were articulated in terms of 
a series of steps as follows. First, the West needed to 
ensure active implementation by Russia of the Minsk 
II agreement, since this agreement was vital for 
preserving the West-Russia relationship. Second, the 
West needed to assure Russia that Ukraine and Georgia 
would never join NATO. Otherwise, was the West 
prepared to keep an open door policy to entice other 
countries to continue to implement Western policies? 
And, consequently, was the West prepared not only to 
perpetuate a relationship of high tension with Russia 
but also cause Russia to keep a high degree of pressure 
on its neighbors? Third, the West’s missile defense 
policies needed to be questioned: Was preserving or 
expanding the West’s current missile defense system 
worth the price of Russian paranoia? Finally, but 
importantly, there was a need for Russia to take the 
first steps, regardless of the situation. 
It was further asked, in turn, why the West should 
endorse Russian paranoia by retracting promises 
made to Ukraine and Georgia by promising that the 
latter two countries would never be a part of NATO. 
The answer to this, however, was made quite clear: 
Georgia and Ukraine could not join NATO, because if 
they did Article 5 would kick in immediately due to the 
presence of Russian troops on what is considered to be 
Georgian and Ukrainian territory. Instead, alternative 
strategies and measures of defense needed to be put 
into place in order to help protect the sovereignty of 
these states in the face of Russian aggression. The West 
could not allow these states to stand on their own, and 
certainly the West did not intend to let them collapse 
into the reincarnation of the Soviet Union. However, 
rather than being obsessive about whether or not the 
West was succumbing to Russia’s paranoia, one ought 
to turn to the bigger question of how the West could get 
back on an even keel with Russia. The first step toward 
reconciliation, as noted, needed to come from Moscow; 
but, nevertheless, the United States still needed to think 
about what steps the West ought to take afterwards. 
How serious a military threat did Russia pose to the 
West? In respect to the developments in the Caucasus, 
there was a rise in Cold War thinking; the Russia-
Georgia War of 2008 had left a vivid impression of 
how easy it was to start a regional conflict that pitched 
Russia against the West. The region remained uneasy 
behind a thin veneer of stability. Russian troops 
remained in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; Georgia 
would still prefer to move closer to the West, but for 
reasons articulated regarding NATO commitments, it 
was not likely to get any closer to the West than being 
in the EU’s Eastern Partnership; Azerbaijan had not 
developed, unlike Georgia, an aversion to Russia, and 
it might even be moving closer to Russia; and Armenia 
had remained too dependent on Russia.
Developments in Syria had also shown the degree of 
Russia’s assertiveness. At a time when the West unani-
mously blamed Assad for the civil war and bloodshed 
in Syria, Russia had continued to defend the Assad 
regime; when Damascus seemed to be in danger of 
defeat, Russia had escalated its military intervention to 
fully support the Assad regime. However, in which ways 
and to what extent the multi-faceted civil war in Syria 
might have had an impact on Russia’s already tense 
relations with the West remained a matter of specula-
tion as a result of the ISIS factor and other collateral 
developments. The rise of ISIS (the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant) and its rapid conquests in Syria 
and Iraq had deflected attention from the ongoing 
Syrian civil war to unprecedented atrocities committed 
7by ISIS militants. ISIS had emerged as the greatest 
threat to Western and regime security because of its 
effective military organization, its ability to recruit 
fighters worldwide, and its disruptive terrorist actions 
in Europe and globally. As a result, the West had not 
reacted vehemently to Russia’s escalated interferences 
in Syria, even if Russia’s and the West’s primary goals 
diverged: Russia’s mission was to prop up the Assad 
regime by closing the immediate vicinity of Damascus 
from opposition forces (that combined a range of U.S. 
armed irregulars to radical Islamists, al-Qaida, and 
ISIS supporters), while the coalition forces focused 
on targeting ISIS positions in other areas of Syria and 
Iraq. Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane that had 
violated (albeit for a few seconds) Turkey’s airspace had 
complicated NATO’s relationship with Moscow even 
more than active Russian intervention in Syria. While 
the Western alliance immediately showed support for 
Turkey as a result of the Russian fighter jet’s violation 
of Turkish airspace, NATO, in particular the Pentagon, 
had not been happy with Turkey’s targeting of Kurdish 
positions across the border mostly in Iraq instead 
of giving full support to the coalition’s air operation 
against ISIS. Washington had made clear several times 
that it did not agree with Turkey’s consideration of the 
Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) as a terrorist 
group allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); 
PYD remained an important ally for Washington in 
the U.S. war against ISIS. By insisting on pursuing its 
own policy priorities in that neighborhood, Ankara 
appeared to have isolated itself from international 
efforts to find a solution to the Syrian crisis. A gradual 
convergence of Russian and Western views, particu-
larly with respect to the cease-fire agreement in Syria, 
had provided a surprising twist to the present history 
of relations between Moscow and Washington, which, 
shaped by mutual distrust, were still far from being 
cordial. 
8T H E  S L I D I N G  W E S T:  
P O P U L I S M  A N D  R E L I G I O N  A S  C H A L L E N G E S  T O  T H E  L I B E R A L  O R D E R
C H A L L E N G E S  TO  L I B E R A L  D E M O C R AC Y:  R E L I G I O N  A N D  P O P U L I S M
The second section began with a focus on populism 
before expanding into the relationship between religion 
and populism. Populism, it was posited, was a difficult 
concept to pin down, but the idea had its roots in Latin 
American politics and was mostly associated with leaders 
such as Peron, Vargas, and Chavez. Populism, an elusive 
term, could be associated with any political movement—
with both the left and right, with fascism and democracy, 
with radical redistribution and neoliberalism. It could be 
a strategy by challengers or incumbents. Any practical 
movement or regime that made its central appeal to 
“the people” had often been characterized as populist. 
Populism could simply be defined as the political 
mobilization and discourse of the antagonism between 
the disenfranchised but honorable populace and the 
immoral elite.8 
Recent scholarship suggested that populism ought not to 
be seen as an entity but as a political practice. According 
to Jansen’s definition, populism had two components: 
mobilization and discursiveness, involving “mobilization 
of ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly 
visible and contentious political action.”9 Populism 
was something political actors do: actively forming “the 
people” as a social group and reconstituting their inter-
ests in line with a leader, a leader in power or opposition. 
Because populism had thrived on the success of getting 
significantly large groups to participate in the political 
process and articulating their demands, milder forms 
of populism had often been confused with participation 
and popular democracy. A clear distinction needed to be 
made between the two: for populism itself would chal-
lenge liberal democracy by virtue of political mobiliza-
tion to support a particular goal, thereby encouraging 
majoritarianism. The discussion then turned to the 
question of what the relationship between populism and 
religion was and why populism was more common in 
some countries and not others.
It is often assumed that religion is a conservative force. 
Yet, it was claimed, this was not necessarily true. Taken 
as a conservative force, religion justified the world as it 
was, as reflected in the works of the great sociologists, 
Marx, Durkheim, and (sometimes even) Weber. It was 
essentially seen as a force to bolster and legitimize the 
status quo. But recent work on the sociology of religion 
8 Robert S. Jansen, “Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to 
Populism,” in The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives, ed. 
Carlos de la Torre, 159-188 (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 
2015), 166-167.
9 Ibid., 168.
had reached diametrically opposite conclusions. The 
“sacred transcendence” of religion (that is, the claim that 
religion offered an ultimate reality beyond our mundane 
world), it was argued, endowed religion with a critical 
outlook. From that perspective, temporal authority 
could be judged according to divine authority, and the 
status quo could be resisted as being a manifestation of 
temporal authority. Accordingly, mobilization against 
the status quo, therefore temporal authority, could 
indeed be considered as religious duty. 
Religion was taken as a just force by which the people 
could collectively and rightfully change the status quo. 
Bellah, for instance, brought an example from American 
democracy to light, citing that the puritanical roots in the 
Protestant covenant—the idea that the American people 
have entered into a covenant with God which, if broken, 
would bring punishment to the sinful nation—had a 
significant impact on mobilizing the American political 
discourse throughout history, including Lincoln’s 
popular religious appeal to end slavery in the 1860s.10 
Indeed, from the colonial era, through Lincoln, and 
through to the modern day, with examples ranging from 
Hurricane Katrina to Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s rela-
tionship to the Obama campaign, religion had been an 
essential part of the American political scene, especially 
as a popular tool for mobilization. 
Religion, therefore, was not necessarily a conservative 
force per se; it could as easily be adapted to further 
popular or populist causes as it could be to reinforce 
conservative positions. Turkey was a case in point: in 
Turkey’s increasingly conservative environment, appeal 
to Muslim values went hand-in-hand with populism; 
in fact, religion came to be used by dominant political 
actors to reinforce populist mobilization. 
In Turkey, there had been a sliding trend towards the 
right—towards becoming not only more Islamic but also 
more centered around the leadership of former Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) leader and current presi-
dent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.11 But why had Turkey been 
sliding toward the right? The convergence of two streaks 
of populism, Islamism and Erdoğanism, it was posited, 
needed further explanation. Recourse to historical 
10 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” originally published in the issue 
“Religion and America,” Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences 96 no. 1 (Winter 1967): 1-21. This article is also available at 
http://www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm, accessed February 20, 2016. 
11 See Nora Fisher Onar, “Islam in Turkey: From Muslim Democracy to Is-
lamist Autocracy?” in Michael Barnett, et al., Faith, Freedom, and Foreign 
Policy (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2015), 53-75.
9sociology was necessary to help explain the rise of such 
trends.
Populism and religion in Turkey largely had revolved 
around the century-old conflict between the center and 
the periphery.12 Referencing Mardin’s scholarship, after 
the ties between the people, the palace, and Islam were 
severed following the reforms of the Turkish Republic in 
the 1920s and 30s, Islam was relegated to the peripheral 
masses, while the new secular, Westernized elite came 
to power. Seeds of this peripheral force were mobilized 
by the conservative populist discourse of the 1950s; 
however, this populist movement was only to be crushed 
by the military in the coup of 1960. Subsequent military 
dominance, as well as the conflict between rural and 
urban, upheld this republican status quo throughout the 
subsequent decades.
The principles of the modern Turkish state, it could be 
argued, began to change after three decades of sliding to 
the right. After the 1980 military coup, the Turkish state 
came to be propped up by a tripartite consensus, the 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which was an effective ruling 
coalition among (i) the military at the top, (ii) the nation-
alists, and (iii) the Islamic-oriented right. As a result, the 
composition of Turkey’s political elite was changed; it 
now included the religious right that had in prior decades 
been concealed. The anti-communist agenda of the 
Cold War further reinforced the standing of this group, 
since the religious right was considered by the United 
States and Turkey’s pro-Western establishment as an 
effective means to counter communist infiltration into 
Turkey and its neighborhood. However, after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
perceptions of the Communist threat lost its immediacy. 
In the meantime, the stalemate of Turkey’s civil war in 
the Southeast throughout the 1990s, a series of ineffec-
tual coalition governments, and mismanaged economy 
resulted in the electoral losses by the nationalist groups 
of the left and center. By the early 2000s the remnants of 
the republican elite that made up the post-1980 coalition 
had totally lost their influence in the political arena.
The sweeping electoral victory of the center-right AKP 
in 2002 marked the beginning of a new era of battle 
for hegemony of the state between the military and the 
Islamic right, which was led by none other than Erdoğan 
and his circle. Through the following years of radical 
change in Turkey, largely inspired by pro-EU reforms, 
Erdoğan was able to cement his power over the long-
standing military establishment, especially by means of 
the 2011 Ergenekon trials, which effectively imprisoned 
12 Şerif Mardin, “Center and Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” 
Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 102, no.1 
(1973): 169-190.
the top brass of the old guard secularist military and 
replaced them with less vocal cadres. Throughout this 
period of fundamental transformation in the political 
sphere, Erdoğan’s leadership cult, some of which had 
followed him since his days as the bombastic, ultra-
conservative Islamist mayor of Istanbul, had continued 
to grow, giving the former prime minister, now president, 
the strength to execute the continuing shift to the right. 
In the fashion of a true populist, Erdoğan had success-
fully given political voice to the disenfranchised masses 
on the religious right, uniting this group around himself 
and the party under an anti-military, anti-elite, pro-
religious discourse. 
In connection with “Jansen’s concept of populist mobi-
lization as political practice,” three factors were cited in 
the Turkish case as summarized briefly above:
1. Political constellation: Given the threat of a military 
or judiciary intervention against the AKP govern-
ment up until 2011 (such as the closures of former 
religious parties, e.g. the Welfare Party and the Virtue 
Party) the AKP leadership had made a systematic 
effort to deemphasize the religious identity of the 
party and not to have a confrontational attitude vis-
à-vis the secularist military and bureaucratic elite. 
By 2011, however, there was no longer a realistic risk 
of a military intervention or a judicial party dissolu-
tion. This represented a significant change in the 
political terrain in which the party operated.
2. Political habitus: Since the late 1980s, Islamic 
parties in Turkey have consistently increased 
their votes by claiming to represent the periphery 
against the secularist center, and Erdoğan’s political 
career—decisively marked by his imprisonment 
in 1999—had depended on this good old formula. 
Now, given the new lack of constraints previously 
imposed by the military and the high judiciary—and 
in preparation for the 2014 local and presidential 
elections—Erdoğan had chosen to play the game that 
he knew best and aimed to consolidate the religious-
conservative constituency of his party.
3. Political events: The Gezi protests, the most signifi-
cant wave of popular anti-government protest in the 
history of the Turkish republic, had led to a desperate 
attempt on the part of Erdoğan to reclaim popular 
support for the AKP and for himself. Erdoğan thus 
pursued a politics of polarization around the old 
center-periphery cleavage in Turkey, most immedi-
ately signified by religious-conservative vs. secular-
Westernized identities and symbols.13
13 Ateş Altınordu, “Religion and Populism,” working paper, Sabancı Universi-
ty, 2015.
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These three factors, it was argued, demonstrate why 
populist mobilization, intrinsically linked to religion, 
has been a conspicuous mark of recent Turkish politics, 
especially since 2013. 
A comparison was suggested between the AKP and the 
Tea Party, the religious right of the American Republican 
Party that also obscured the boundaries between religion, 
politics, and freedom—the only difference was that the 
AKP kept on winning elections. An additional similarity 
between the Tea Party and the AKP was distaste for insti-
tutions, seen as obstructive constructs to the manifesta-
tion of popular will. 
Another feature of populism in the Turkish case was 
the blurring of distinction between legality and reality. 
Widespread criticism and protests swept across Turkey 
with the Gezi Park protests in 2013 until these protests 
had been suppressed by disproportionate use of violence 
by security forces. Since the AKP had been in power for 
over a decade by the time the Gezi Park protest began, 
why the Turks could not see the authoritarian drift earlier 
was a question raised, as was the question “why didn’t the 
EU see Turkey’s drift,” especially since it was a candidate 
state for membership subject to scrutiny by the Euro-
pean Commission, which published an annual report 
on Turkey, the so-called Progress Report. In response 
it was suggested that the AKP had presented itself as 
a moderate Islamist party, which was an intoxicating 
concept for the EU policymakers. Its rapid domestication 
of the military and isolation of the military from political 
power obscured its other, less liberal policies, and the EU 
became fascinated with these Muslim populists in power.
Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies and increasing ties 
with his Islamic neighbors had called into question the 
West’s post-Arab Spring idea that Turkey can be a “model 
of Muslim democracy” for the Middle East. If Turkey 
were to proceed on a road towards increased Islamism, 
how would roughly half the population with secular 
preferences respond? Additionally, in the post-Gezi Park 
period, the question of the “other” Muslims, that is, the 
Alevis and Kurds, had come to present a precarious chal-
lenge to the pro-Erdoğan, non-Kurdish, Sunni Islamic 
identity that Ankara had cultivated. On the one hand, the 
growing voices of the Alevi and Kurdish minority narra-
tives that had sprung out of the Gezi movement posed 
a challenge to the post-1980 top-down Islamization of 
Turkey. On the other hand, it is exactly this strategy of 
top-down Islamism imposed by the military in the 1980s 
that had produced a compliant generation that was also 
keen to reinforce the authoritarian legitimacy of Erdoğan 
as the singular head of state. Current conflicts in the 
Southeast between the Turkish Armed Forces and the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as the state’s 
political relationship with the self-identified Kurdish 
Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), were pointing to the 
extent of the divide between state-sanctioned religion and 
the state’s regard for its Kurdish population. Overall, it 
was indeed difficult to say whether Turkey was becoming 
more religious, given the rise of these narratives coun-
tering authoritarianism. Ultimately, however, the results 
and consequences of the 2015 general election—which, 
due to the failure of the four parties elected on June 7 to 
form a coalition, was superseded by a snap election held 
on November 1—would guide, rightly or wrongly, Western 
opinions about the Islamist trend. 
Another violently radical trend exemplified by ISIS had 
presented a deeply disturbing combination of religion 
and populism that ran counter to, yet alluringly alongside, 
the traditional conception of Islam and the state. Within 
the past four years of conflict in Syria, ISIS had not only 
managed to gain a vast amount of territory throughout 
the Levant by mobilizing an army of jihadists, but it had 
also managed a heavily enticing propaganda machine that 
had recruited tens of thousands of fighters, including over 
20,000 foreign fighters. ISIS not only held the monopoly 
on violence in the Islamic world through publishing 
series of violent videos, largely brutal beheadings of 
Westerners and those of their own faith who they have 
branded as “apostates,” but it also offered the promise 
of a utopian, albeit puritanical and separatist, Islamic 
State grounded in tangible territory. Such propaganda 
functioned both as a warning to the West and as a means 
to legitimize violent murder in the name of religion, vis-
à-vis its rhetoric to its own population and to the world. 
This pattern of justification should not be surprising, 
given decades of global jihadist activity, particularly in the 
region. However, the idea of jihadists claiming an actual 
state under the auspice of a self-proclaimed caliphate was 
something new and quite particular to ISIS itself. That, in 
turn, constituted a new affront to the ruling liberal order. 
From the Western perspective, ISIS seemingly had no 
method to its madness, for example, the barbaric destruc-
tion or black market sales of historic relics. Upon closer 
look, however, it was revealed that such sales were used 
to finance Islamic State activity as well as a propaganda 
tool to destroy secular Western-supported narratives 
of civilization. From a Western perspective, the alleged 
imposition of upwards of 50 percent tax on all goods in 
the state and calls to physically sacrifice oneself for the 
cause would be thought to deter residents (or rather 
slaves) from resisting ISIS. It was also argued that the 
popular appeal of fighting a war in the name of religion 
to construct global change ought not be underestimated, 
especially given the intrinsic connection between 
populism and religion throughout modern history. 
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In the wake of a discussion that dwelt on some signifi-
cant ways in which Turkey seemed to be diverging from 
both the EU and the transatlantic alliance in general, 
the question of whether Turkey had left the West was 
inevitably raised. 
Although Turkey’s drift to the right might have had 
parallels in Europe, its confessional particularism 
appeared to be in sharp contrast with the non-
confessional principles of the West. The fact that 
Ankara’s confessional particularism was incorporated 
into Turkey’s foreign policy appeared to reflect a 
divergence from the European and U.S. foreign policy 
in that Turkey chose to play the role of an independent 
regional power rather than that of a NATO member 
state negotiating for EU membership. Particularism, 
especially of a sectarian kind, was arguably against 
the internationalist/universalist tenants of the liberal 
order. 
Turkey’s engagement with Russia also put strains 
on Turkey’s transatlantic relations, especially when 
Erdoğan approached Putin in 2013 to ask for his 
intersession to have Turkey admitted to membership 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Earlier 
that year, Ankara had announced a major military 
procurement decision to award a contract to develop 
a long-range missile system to a Chinese company. On 
that occasion, an incredulous Washington hastened to 
voice its objection to the mixing of NATO’s sophisti-
cated defense system with non-allied foreign ones. 
Given the increasing destabilization of the Middle East 
and North Africa, however, both Europe and the United 
States had appeared to support Turkey as a potentially 
stabilizing actor in the region. Major differences aside, 
Turkey’s NATO membership was not questioned by 
either side, and Erdoğan’s bid for Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization membership, soon dropped, 
was taken as a bluff triggered by Ankara’s frustration 
over its stalled EU membership talks. And, although 
stalled, the membership negotiations had not been 
suspended; neither side had suggested that they should 
be suspended or terminated.
Whether Turkey had left the West remained an 
outstanding question in the absence of concrete 
evidence one way or the other.
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